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In a society as religiously diverse as ours, the Court has recognized that
we must rely on the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to protect
against religious strife, particularly when what is at issue is an area as
central to religious belief as the shaping, through primary education, of
the next generation's minds and spirits.'
I. INTRODUCTION
T he issue of government aid to religious schools and institutions in
the United States is once again at the forefront of political debate
throughout the country. Recent calls by conservative leaders for school
vouchers, tax benefits, and direct funding of church activities have been
stirring excitement and earning headlines in major newspapers. Since the
passage of the No Child Left Behind Act2 and the launching of President
Bush's "Faith-Based Initiative" program,3 the battle between secular and
'Zelnan v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,725 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425
(2002) (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). The No Child Left Behind Act
was actually passed in 2002. Under the Act, states are required to test all students
in grades three through eight in reading and mathematics every year as a condition
of receiving federal Title I aid. In disadvantaged schools that fail to make adequate
yearly progress for three consecutive years, students can use Title I funds to
transfer to a higher-performing public school, or to pay for supplemental
educational services.
3 In December 2002, President Bush issued an Executive Order to eliminate
discrimination against faith-based and community organizations. He also called on
Congress to pass important legislation that increases charitable giving and
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sectarian forces in the United States has intensified, raising the prospect
that the future of public education in America could be in jeopardy.4 In the
spring of 2003, United States Secretary of Education, Rod Paige, sparked
"a storm of criticism with remarks praising the values of Christian schools"
and stating his "personal preference" for educating children in Christian
schools over public schools.5
The recent trend in favor of school vouchers and greater accountability
by way of sanctioning failing public schools is indicative of the mounting
pressure on policy makers and the courts to tear down the figurative wall
of separation between church and state in American education. Opponents
of the "wall" argue that there is nothing wrong with giving individuals the
choice of where or how to educate their children and that the principle of
religious freedom embodied in the First Amendment protects a child's right
to be educated in a religious environment. Supporters of the "wall" contend
that increased government aid to religious schools through voucher or tax
benefit programs undermines the "no aid to religion" principle espoused by
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison and embodied in the First Amend-
ment's Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. In response
to the growing controversy, the U.S. Supreme Court, led by a compliant
conservative majority, has handed down some important decisions over the
last decade which have redefined the legal relationship between church and
state in American education and paved the way for vouchers and other
religion-based initiatives.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the impact of the Supreme
Court's recent decisions on American education and to highlight the
substantial erosion of the "wall of separation" between church and state
over the past three decades. Specifically, this Article seeks to show that the
road to vouchers and "school choice" in American education has been
paved gradually by an ideologically-driven majority of Justices on the
Supreme Court. Part II of this Article will address the history and rationale
behind the First Amendment's Establishment Clause and, in particular,
focus on the efforts of Jefferson and Madison to guard against religious
strife by erecting a wall of separation between church and state in the new
strengthens faith-based and other neighborhood groups involved in community
service. Exec. Order No. 13,279, 3 C.F.R. 258 (2002), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2003). The President's religious-based initiative has been the subject of
controversy from the moment he announced it early in his Presidency.
4 See Eric Lichtblau, Bush Plans to Let Religious Groups Get Building Aid,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2003, at Al.
5 See Diane Jean Schemo, Church-State Furor Engulfs Education Chief, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 2003, at A18.
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Republic.' Part Ell will examine the Supreme Court's gradual shift away
from the principle of "strict separation" during the post-Civil Rights era,
highlighting those decisions which caused the initial blurring of the wall
separating church and state in American education.' Part IV will analyze
some of the important Court decisions affecting education during the
Reagan-Bush era, focusing specifically on the change in composition of the
Court and the ideological shift in favor of greater government involvement
in religious education.' Part V discusses the emergence of two new legal
standards the Court created to measure the constitutionality of government
aid programs benefiting parochial schools.9 Part VI describes the land-
mark ruling in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris in 2002, which upheld an Ohio
voucher program that enabled parents to send their children to private and
parochial schools at taxpayer expense, and the impact this decision has had
on the "school choice" movement in the United States." This Article will
conclude by arguing that the Zelman decision marked the triumph of
sectarianism over secularism in American education. With this decision, the
Supreme Court effectively extinguished Jefferson's and Madison's vision
of a prosperous democratic Republic buttressed by an effective system of
secular public education. By demolishing the wall of separation between
church and state in the Zelman case, the Supreme Court has set the stage for
an era of religious apartheid in America and possibly even conflict between
religious groups over who is entitled to the public's money.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
AND ITS EARLY INTERPRETATION
A. The Founding Fathers and the Construction of the Wall of Separation
Between Church and State
To better understand the history behind the principle of separation
between church and state, it is important to examine the intent of the
Founding Fathers in drafting the First Amendment to the Constitution.
During the Colonial period, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison were the
chiefproponents ofthe separation principle. " In 1779, Jefferson drafted the
6 See infra notes 11-38 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 39-100 and accompanying text.
'See infra notes 101-22 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 123-90 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 191-228 and accompanying text.
"See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Backgrounder [sic] on the Virginia Statute for
Religious Freedom, in BASIC READINGS INU.S. DEMOCRACY, at http://usinfo.state.
gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/42.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2003).
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Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty which argued against taxation proposals
aimed at supporting religion:
[T]o compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation
of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; that even the
forcing him to support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion,
is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to
the particular pastor, whose morals he would make his pattern, and whose
power he feels most persuasive to righteousness .... 12
To Jefferson, past rulers, civil and ecclesiastical, had assumed control
over most of the world through the skillful manipulation of religion and
mankind's fear of God. He agreed with the English political philoso-
pher John Locke, who wrote in his Letter Concerning Toleration, that the
"care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate because his power
consists only in outward force."' 3 True and saving religion, Locke argued,
"consist[s] in the inward and full persuasion of the mind."' 4 Both Locke
and Jefferson believed that complete religious freedom should be recog-
nized by the law and that no government should prescribe the faith of its
citizens.
Jefferson's views concerning religious freedom are clear in his Billfor
Religious Liberty in Virginia. According to the bill,
[N]o man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship,
place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested,
or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account
of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess,
and by argument to maintain, their opinion in matters of religion, and that
the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capaci-
ties. 5
Religious liberty, Jefferson believed, was not limited to certain sects or
even Christianity as a whole; it was extended to all faiths. "The care of
12 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF
VIRGINIA 85 (William Walter Hening ed., Richmond, Va., George Cochran 1823)
[hereinafter VIRGINIA STATUTES AT LARGE].
13 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION 127 (J.W. Gough ed., 1955).
14 Ido
15 VIRGINIA STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 12, at 86.
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every man's soul," he wrote, "belongs to himself; ... God himself cannot
save a man against his will; and any form of spiritual compulsion is
doomed to inevitable failure."' 6
At the same time that Jefferson proposed his Bill for Establishing
Religious Freedom, a second bill was introduced in the Virginia General
Assembly by the prolific statesman Patrick Henry, which declared that "the
Christian Religion shall in all times coming be deemed and held to be the
established Religion of the Commonwealth."' 7 In remonstrating against
Henry's proposed bill, James Madison argued against the Commonwealth's
endorsement of Christianity:
Who does not see that the same authority which can establish
Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the
same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other
Sects? That the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute
three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment,
may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases
whatsoever? 8
In Madison's view, a true religion did not need the support of law or
taxpayer money, and cruel persecutions were the inevitable result of
government-established religion. 9 In Memorial and Remonstrance, he
wrote that establishment of religion weakened the beliefs of adherents so
favored, strengthened their opponents, and generated "pride and indolence
in the Clergy; ignorance and servility in the laity; [and] in both, supersti-
16 See 1 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND His TIME 275 (1948).
" The bill required every person to enroll his name with the county clerk and
designate a religious society that he intended to support for taxation purposes.
Taxes would be obtained and distributed to the designated Christian organization
accordingly. For those who did not register with a particular Christian organization,
taxes would be spread across the various religious sects. See LEO PFEFFER,
CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 109 (1967).
James Madison, Memorial andRemonstranceAgainst Religious Assessments,
in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 186 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901). Madison wrote
against a backdrop in which nearly every Colony had at one time exacted a tax for
church support. See PFEFFER, supra note 17, at 109, 123, 125-26; R. FREEMAN
BUTrs & LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, A HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN AMERICAN
CULTURE 15-22 (1953); R. FREEMAN BUTTS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION IN
RELIGION AND EDUCATION 14-16, 66-67 (1950).
"9 See Madison, supra note 18, at 187.
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tion, bigotry and persecution."2 To Madison, an official religion was no
more pleasing a prospect than an official church, and, therefore, it was best
to keep religion and government separate. Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance played a central role in defeating the Virginia tax assessment
bill in 1786.21
Jefferson and Madison captured the colonists' conviction that
individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government
which was prohibited from taxing or supporting religious activity of any
kind, or interfering with the religious beliefs of any individual or group.
Compelling an individual to support religion violated the fundamental
principles of freedom of conscience and liberty of personal conviction
necessary for the American democratic experiment to succeed. Jefferson's
Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom and Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance provided the logic and rationale for the "wall of separation"
between church and state upon which the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment are based.22
The First Amendment to the Constitution was ratified in 1791. The
First Amendment's Establishment Clause states, "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. ,2" The purpose of the Clause was to put an end to the religious
discrimination and persecution that had plagued the "Old World" for
centuries.24 The Clause embodies an understanding that liberty and social
20 id.
2! See William Sierichs, Jr., Ye Olde Walls of Separation, FREETHOUGHT
TODAY, Mar. 2001, http://www.ffrf.org/fttoday/march01/sierichs.html.
22 The earliest use of the metaphor "wall of separation" can be found in Richard
Hooker's Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politic in the sixteenth century whereby
Hooker wrote that dissenters of the Anglican Church demanded that the "walls of
separation" between church and Commonwealth must forever be upheld. See
Richard Hooker, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politic, in DIVINE RIGHT AND
DEMOCRACY: AN ANTHOLOGY OF POLITICAL WRITING IN STUART ENGLAND 214
(David Wootten ed., 1986). The phrase is later found in the Englishman James
Burgh's book CRITO, or Essays on Various Subjects, wherein Burgh, in
condemning regression of Roman Catholics, demanded, "Build an impenetrable
wall of separation between things sacred and civil." JAMES BURGH, 11 CRITO, OR
ESSAYS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 119 (1767). This book was widely read throughout
the colonies and influenced the philosophical views of Jefferson and Madison.
23 
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
"5 See, e.g., Paul A. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARv. L. REV.
1680, 1692 (1969). The development of medieval Europe was almost solely that
of continual struggle between church and state, with kings rebelling against the
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stability demand a religious tolerance that respects the religious views of
all citizens; it permits those citizens "to worship God in their own way and
to teach their children and to form their characters" as they wish.25 The
government, in other words, was bound by the Constitution to "neither
support nor oppose any particular form of the church but to leave all of
them strictly alone." '26 In 1802, Jefferson described the Establishment
Clause metaphorically as "a wall of separation between Church and
State. 27
This wall of separation was not challenged much during the early years
of the Republic. America's common schools, including the first public
schools, were largely Protestant in character and there was little concern or
debate over issues such as diversity.2" It was common to teach students the
King James version of the Bible and to recite Protestant prayers in class.29
Though discriminatory, these practices were not perceived to be divisive
because the population at the time was substantially homogeneous.30
By the turn of the century, however, immigration and growth had
changed American society dramatically. In 1900, there were roughly twelve
million Catholics in America, and the Jewish population had grown
significantly.3 With this increase in population, non-Protestants began to
resist the Protestant domination of the nation's public schools.32 Religious
conflict between Protestants and Catholics grew intense, and sometimes
violent, as "Catholic students suffered beatings or expulsions for refusing
church, and the power of the state being readily put to use to stamp out heretics and
nonconformists.
25 LORD RADCLIFFE, THE LAW & ITS COMPASS 71 (1960).
26 MALONE, supra note 16, at 275-76.
27 See Thomas Jefferson, Address Before a Committee of the Danbury Baptist
Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 307, 307 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1998).
2 See, e.g., David Tyack, Onward Christian Soldiers: Religion in the American
Common School, in HISTORY AND EDUCATION: THE EDUCATIONAL USES OF THE
PAST 217-26 (Paul Nash ed., 1970).
29Id.
30 At the time of the founding of the Republic, Catholics consisted of less than
two percent of the American church-affiliated population. See BARRY A. KOSMIN
& SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN, ONENATION UNDER GOD: RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN SOCIETY 45 (1993).
3" John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establish-
ment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REv. 279, 299-300 (2001).
32 See id. at 300-05.
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to read from the Protestant Bible."3 Nevertheless, this rise in religious
strife at the time did not prompt much litigation over the issue of separation
of church and state. During this period, there were few lawsuits invoking
the Establishment Clause and most resulted in the Supreme Court not even
addressing the question of the constitutionality of government aid to
religious schools.34
B. The Everson Decision: Challenging the "Wall of Separation " in
Education
After World War U, the arena of public education became the primary
battleground for supporters and opponents of the "wall of separation" to
wage their campaigns defining the proper relationship between church and
state in American society. America's system of secular public schools had
long been regarded as the cornerstone of American democracy, and it
served as a model for public school systems in Europe and East Asia after
the war. Given the rise in the number of private and religious schools
during the twentieth century and the resulting rise in demand for funds to
maintain these schools, however, it was only a matter of time until the "no
aid to religion" principle would be tested in American education.
The inaugurating case of the modem era of Establishment Clause
doctrine was Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing in 1947." In
Everson, a New Jersey taxpayer challenged a state program providing
public money to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils on city buses
as part of a general scheme to reimburse the public-transportation costs of
children attending both public and private schools.36 In a split decision, the
Supreme Court held that the program did not violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, but the Court did draw a clear line
preserving the principle of separation from which there was no dissent:
33 Id. at 300.
34 In Cochran v. Louisiana Board of Education, the Supreme Court did not
address the Establishment Clause question when it upheld a state program
providing textbooks to children attending nonpublic schools on the basis that the
program had an adequate public purpose. See Cochran v. La. Bd. of Educ., 281
U.S. 370, 375 (1930). In the 1908 case of Quick Bear v. Leupp, the Court also
upheld payments by Indian tribes to Roman Catholic schools, suggesting in dicta
that there was no Establishment Clause problem even though the Court did not
squarely face the issue. See Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 81-82 (1908).
35 Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).36Id. at3.
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The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go
or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can
be levied to support religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
37
The Court reiterated Jefferson's phrase that the Establishment Clause was
"intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and state."'
38
The applicability of the Establishment Clause to public aid programs
benefiting religious schools was settled in Everson. For the next few
decades, the Supreme Court never repudiated its strict interpretation of the
"wall of separation" and the basic principle of "no aid to religion" through
public benefits was unquestioned.
Im. THE BLURRING OF THE WALL OF SEPARATION
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: 1968-1980
The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1965 was a turning point for
America's system of education. The aftermath of the Act's passage was
characterized by new opportunities for African-Americans and the racial
integration of workplaces and public schools. At the same time, the post-
Civil Rights era ushered in a new period of migration and "white flight" to
the suburbs, altering dramatically the demographic make-up of urban areas
around the country.39 The effect of this demographic shift was that whites
virtually abandoned public schools in the inner cities," where minority
attendance was relatively high, and a concomitant increase in the number
of private and parochial schools. This period of white flight and private
school growth coincided with a series of new legal challenges to existing
Establishment Clause doctrine and with new interpretations by the Supreme
Court of the "no-aid to religion" principle.
371 Id. at 15-16 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
38 See id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164).
31 See Greg Winter, Schools Resegregate, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
2003, at A14.
0 id.
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A. The Lemon Test and the Early Exceptions to the Strict Separation
Principle
The erosion of the wall of separation between church and state in
American education began nearly two decades after Everson in the case of
Board ofEducation of Central School District No. I v. Allen.41 InAllen, the
Supreme Court upheld a New York law authorizing local school boards to
lend textbooks in secular subjects to children attending religious schools.42
In its decision, the Court relied on the theory that the in-kind aid could only
be used for secular educational purposes.43 The Court found it relevant that
"no funds or books are furnished [directly] to parochial schools, and the
financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools."
The Allen Court recognized that religious instruction and secular
education can become entangled at religious schools.4" Nevertheless, the
Court reasoned that if indirect state aid could be restricted to serve the
latter, it is permissible under the Establishment Clause.46 To avoid the
entanglement, the Court's focus in the post-Allen line of cases would have
to be on the question of divertibility. Under this concept, the greater the
risk of diverting public money to religious purposes in public schools, the
less legitimate the aid scheme was under the separation principle.
Perhaps the most important case dealing with the question of diver-
tibility in the post-Civil Rights period was Lemon v. Kurtzman.47 In Lemon,
the Supreme Court held that state statutes providing public aid to church-
related elementary and secondary schools violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.4" In reaching its decision, the Court
focused on the difficult task of line drawing in Establishment Clause
"' Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
42 See id. at 238.
41 See id. at 243.
"See id. at 243-44.
41 See id. at 248.
46d. at 243-45.47 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
48See id. at 625. As described by the Court,
Pennsylvania has adopted a statutory program that provides financial
support to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools by way of
reimbursement for the cost of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional
materials in specified secular subjects. Rhode Island adopted a statute under
which the State pays directly to teachers in nonpublic elementary schools
a supplement of 15% of their annual salary.
Id. at 606-07.
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matters and established a three-part test to resolve conflicts arising from
government programs that sponsor, support or become involved in religious
education. First, the Court argued that for a law to be valid, it must have a
"secular legislative purpose."49 Second, the law's "principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion."50 Third, the
law "must not foster an excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion."" A violation of any one of these prongs was all that was required to
invalidate a law under the Establishment Clause.
In applying the test to the challenged statutes, the Court held that both
statutes violated the "excessive entanglement" portion of the test.52 Accord-
ing to the Court, both statutes violated the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, as "the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising
under the statutes in each State involve[d] excessive entanglement between
government and religion."53 One of the Court's major concerns in the case
was that children could subtly fall prey to religious influences at school
with the support of the government even though this was not the intent
behind the law nor the intent of school policy.54 "We need not and do not
assume that teachers in parochial schools will be guilty of bad faith or any
conscious design to evade the limitations imposed by the statute and the
First Amendment," argued Chief Justice Burger." "We simply recognize
that a dedicated religious person, teaching in a school affiliated with
his or her faith and operated to inculcate its tenets, will inevitably exper-
ience great difficulty in remaining religiously neutral., 56 "With the best
intentions," Justice Burger added, "such a teacher would find it hard
to make a total separation between secular teaching and religious doc-
trine. 57
The Lemon decision was important for two reasons. First, the Court
synthesized its jurisprudence since Everson by enunciating a test--the
Lemon test--to aid courts and legislatures in their interpretation of the
Establishment Clause in education. Second, the Court observed that the line
or "wall" separating church and state was not as clear-cut as the Everson
491 Id. at 612.
50 Id.
s' Id. at 613.2Id. at 614.
sId. at 613-14.
s4See id. at 618-19.
S5Id. at 618.
56 id.
57Id. at 618-19.
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Court described. According to Chief Justice Burger in Lemon, "[j]udicial
caveats against entanglement must recognize that the line of separation, far
from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending
on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.""8 The blurring of the
line separating church and state signaled a shift in philosophy within the
Court away from the Madisonian idea of "no aid to religion" to no aid that
could be diverted to support the religious, as distinct from the secular,
activity of an institutional beneficiary.
With the establishment of the Lemon test, a strict application of the "no
aid to religion" principle was no longer practical. Every case had to be
examined under the Lemon test, and the Court was saddled with the task of
applying the three prongs to a number of different factual scenarios. The
result of this change in the Supreme Court's approach to Establishment
Clause challenges was the Court's inability to avoid creating new standards
or parameters to judge aid programs benefiting religious education.
In Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,59
the Supreme Court applied the Lemon test and struck down a New York
program of tuition grants for poor parents and tax deductions for more
affluent ones who sent their children to religious schools.' Although the
program was enacted for ostensibly "secular purposes," the Court found
that its "effect" was "unmistakably to provide desired financial support for
nonpublic, sectarian institutions." '61 The Court focused on what the aid
bought when it reached the endpoint of its disbursement and reasoned that
such aid to parents indirectly through tax deductions was no different from
forbidden direct aid to religious schools for religious uses.62
The Nyquist decision was significant because the case gave the Court
an opportunity to evaluate the separation principle and to apply the Lemon
test in the context of state tax policy impacting religious education.
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that there was no distinction between
"direct" and "indirect" aid to parochial schools under the separation
principle. Such aid in either form was deemed to violate the "no aid to
58Id. at 614.
59 Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
60 The New York program provided financial aid to nonpublic primary and
secondary schools byway of (1) grants to nonpublic schools for "maintenance and
repair" of facilities and equipment; (2) tuition reimbursement to parents whose
children were enrolled in elementary and secondary schools; and (3) tax relief for
parents who did not qualify for the tuition reimbursement plan. Id. at 762-65.
61 Id. at 783.
62 See id. at 793.
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religion" principle. The creation of this line between "direct and "indirect"
aid to religious schools would take on increased significance in the Court's
examination of Meek v. Pittenger two years later.63
In Meek, the Supreme Court rejected part of a Pennsylvania law
authorizing the state to provide auxiliary services, textbooks, and instruc-
tional materials to children attending church-related schools.' 4 The Court
approved only the part of the program that authorized the loaning of
textbooks because the textbooks were secular and were the same as those
used in the public schools.65 The Court reasoned that the benefit of the
loaned textbooks accrued to the parents or students, not directly to the
school, because the students would be using the same books in public
schools. 66 The Court refused to bring auxiliary services and instructional
materials under the constitutional umbrella because these services and
materials could be used directly by the school to advance religion in
church-related schools.67
By the end of the 1970s, the wall of separation between church and
state had begun to erode, even though it was still largely intact. The
Supreme Court had established a new framework through which to examine
state funding programs targeting aid to religious primary and secondary
schools. The Lemon test, the doctrine of "divertibility," and the direct/
63 See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), overruled in part by Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
" Id. at 373. One part of the law, Act 194, provided auxiliary services to
children enrolled in nonpublic schools, including counseling, testing psychological
services, speech and hearing therapy, and services for disadvantaged and
exceptional children. The other part, Act 195, extended a direct loan of textbooks
and instructional materials and equipment to parochial schools. The law defined
instructional materials and equipment as photographs, maps, charts, globes, films,
projection equipment, recording equipment, etc. Id. at 351-55.
651d. at 361.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 363. The Supreme Court in Wolman v. Walter similarly upheld the
constitutionality of an Ohio statute that permitted the expenditure of state funds to
purchase secular textbooks for loan to the students, for use of standardized test and
scoring services that were the same as those used in public schools, and for the
provision of diagnostic and therapeutic services to the students. Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229, 238 (1977), overruled in part by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000). On the other hand, the Court struck down that part of the law that
authorized state money for purchases of instructional materials and equipment for
the students and for transportation for field trips. Id. at 250. The Court relied less
on the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" aid to religious schools and
focused more on the three Lemon factors to reach its decision. Id. at 253-54.
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indirect distinction had replaced the "no aid to religion" rule as the guide-
post for the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
Allen, Lemon, Nyquist, and Meek were indicative of the growing political
pressure on state legislatures to provide aid to private and parochial schools
at the elementary and secondary levels. Similarly, the realm of higher
education was experiencing its own shift in Establishment Clause juris-
prudence, and state legislatures encountered strong pressure to expand
public aid to religious institutions of higher learning.
B. "Divertibility " and the "Pervasively Sectarian " Standard in Higher
Education
AlthoughEverson remained the governing decision as applied to public
benefits inuring to religious schools, the Supreme Court during the 1970s
and early-1980s proved to be more willing to tolerate government aid
schemes earmarking money for religious institutions of higher learning if
the aid was indirect or not divertible to religious functions. Generally, in
judging whether aid programs to institutions of higher learning crossed the
line separating church and state, the Court tried to be practical, upholding
aid earmarked for secular use when the aid recipients were not so
"pervasively sectarian" that their secular and religious functions could not
be kept apart.
On the same day that the Lemon test was established, the Supreme
Court addressed the question of diverting federal aid to religious institu-
tions of higher learning in Tilton v. Richardson.6" The issue in Tilton
was whether four church-related colleges and universities69 could receive
federal aid under Title I of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963,
which provides construction grants for buildings and facilities used
exclusively for secular educational purposes.7" The Court applied the
68 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
69 The four institutions were Sacred Heart University, Annhurst College,
Fairfield University, and Albertus Magnus College. At the time, all four schools
were governed by Catholic religious organizations, and the faculties and student
bodies at each were predominantly Catholic. Id. at 686.
701 d. at 675. Title I authorized "direct" grants and loans for facility construction
on public and private campuses. The facilities must have been used for defined
secular purposes not for religious instruction, training, or worship. Higher Edu-
cation Facilities Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-2040, 77 Stat. 363 (1963). As noted
by the Supreme Court, the "Act itself was carefully drafted to ensure that the
federally subsidized facilities would be devoted to the secular and not the religious
function of the recipient institutions." Tilton, 403 U.S. at 679.
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Lemon test and held that direct Title I aid to these church-related schools
did not violate the Establishment Clause because religious indoctrination
was not a substantial purpose or activity of these schools.71 According to
Chief Justice Burger, who wrote the majority opinion, there was "no
evidence that religion seeps into the use of any of these facilities. 72 The
Court focused on the second prong of the Lemon test by arguing that "[t]he
crucial question is not whether some benefit accrues to a religious
institution as a consequence of the legislative program, but whether its
principal or primary effect advances religion. 73 In its analysis of the
"government entanglement" prong of the Lemon test, the Court held that
"[s]ince religious indoctrination is not a substantial purpose or activity of
these church-related colleges and universities, there is less likelihood than
in primary and secondary schools that religion will permeate the area of
secular education., 74 This, the Court believed, "reduces the risk that
government aid will in fact serve to support religious activities," thereby
decreasing the risk of entanglement between government and religion.75
The Court's willingness to permit government aid to go forward in this
case, and not in Lemon, was based on the premise that church-related
institutions of higher learning and religious elementary and secondary
schools were fundamentally different. "The 'affirmative if not dominant
policy' of the instruction in pre-college church schools," the court asserted,
"is 'to assure future adherents to a particular faith by having control of their
total education at an early age.' , 76 The Court also argued that primary and
secondary school students were more vulnerable to being indoctrinated into
a particular faith because they were younger and more easily influenced
than the average college-aged student.77 According to the Court, "[t]here is
substance to the contention that college students are less impressionable
and less susceptible to religious indoctrination.78 Moreover, the Court
pointed out that even though the church-related institutions were governed
by Roman Catholic organizations and had predominantly Catholic students
and faculty members, the record showed that no one was required to attend
religious services, each institution's curriculum was characterized by a high
degree of "academic freedom," and "courses [were] taught according to
71 Tilton, 403 U.S. at 681-82.
721d. at 681.
73 See id. at 679.
74 Id. at 687.
75 id.
76 Id. at 685-86 (quoting Walz v. Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970)).
77 Id. at 686.
78 Id.
[VOL. 92
THE ROAD TO VOUCHERS
the academic requirements of the subject matter and the teacher's concept
of professional standards."79
The effect of Tilton on higher education finance was significant. Within
a few years of the decision, several states amended their constitutions to
permit direct student grant and loan aid to go to private religious institu-
tions. 0 Tilton extended the applicability of the Lemon test beyond the realm
of public aid to primary and secondary schools, and it further blurred the
wall separating permissible from impermissible aid to religious institutions
under the Establishment Clause. According to the Court, "candor compels
the acknowledgment that we can only dimly perceive the boundaries of
permissible government activity in this sensitive area.""1 The Tilton Court,
however, left unresolved the question of whether public money could be
diverted to a religious school if religion permeated a substantial portion of
that school's activities. This question was addressed directly in Hunt v.
McNair.
82
In Hunt, the South Carolina Educational Facilities Authority Act 83 was
challenged as a violation of the Establishment Clause insofar as it
authorized financing through the issuance of revenue bonds to benefit a
Baptist-controlled collegef Consistent with the Supreme Court's approach
in Tilton, the Court applied the Lemon test and concluded that the statute's
purpose was secular and that it did not have the primary effect of advancing
or inhibiting religion, nor did it foster excessive government entanglement
with religion.85 The Court reasoned that there was little in the record that
suggested that the college's operations were oriented significantly towards
sectarian rather than secular education. 6 It did say, however, that aid may
have the primary effect of advancing religion when "it flows to an
institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its
79 Id.
80 Virginia, Georgia, and Massachusetts were some of the states that amended
their constitutions to permit public money to go towards grants and loans to support
private institutions. See generally A.E. DICK HOWARD, STATE AID TO PRIVATE
HIGHER EDUCATION (1977).
81 Tilton, 403 U.S. at 678.
82 Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
13 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-109-10 to 59-109-180 (Law. Co-op. 2003). The Act
established an Educational Facilities Authority to assist, through the issuance of
revenue bonds, higher educational institutions in constructing and financing
building projects. The Act, however, did not include facilities used for sectarian
instruction or religious worship. Hunt, 413 U.S. at 736-37.
84 Hunt, 413 U.S. at 736.
" Id. at 741-49.86Id. at 746.
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functions are subsumed in the religious mission."87 This language allowed
for the possibility of finding an Establishment Clause violation where
public money is distributed to support institutions that are "pervasively
sectarian.""
In 1976, the issue of "pervasive sectarianism" was tested when the
Supreme Court reviewed a First Amendment challenge to a state financing
scheme for higher education in Roemer v. Board of Public Works. 9 In
Roemer, a First Amendment challenge was brought against a Maryland
statute that authorized public aid in the form of non-categorical annual
grants provided to eligible colleges and universities within the state of
Maryland.9" Again, applying the Lemon test, the Court held that the statute
did not violate the Establishment Clause because the aid did not have the
primary effect of advancing religion nor did it foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion.9' The Court reasoned that the
primary effect portion of the Lemon analysis was not satisfied because the
eligible private institutions were not "so permeated by religion that the
secular side cannot be separated from the sectarian" side. 92 The Court then
concluded, using language from Hunt, "that no state aid at all may go to
institutions that are so 'pervasively sectarian' that secular activities cannot
be separated from sectarian ones, and ... if secular activities can be
separated out, they alone must be funded."93
Once again, the Supreme Court applied a balancing test comparing the
level of religious activity to secular activity on college campuses. The
Court, in defending the funding scheme, focused on three aspects of the
institution in making its decision. First, the Court stressed that although the
Roman Catholic Church was represented on the governing boards of each
college, there was "no instance of entry of Church considerations into
I71d. at 743.
88See id. The majority opinion in Hunt quoted Chief Justice Burger, who held
open the possibility in Tilton that some institutions may not pass the pervasively
sectarian test and could be challenged accordingly. He said, "Individual projects
can be properly evaluated if and when challenges arise with respect to particular
recipients and some evidence is then presented to show that the institution does in
fact possess these characteristics."Id. (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,
682 (1971)).
9 Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
90 Id. at 740.
91 Id. at 737-38.
92Id. at 759 (quoting Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 387 F. Supp. 1282, 1293
(D. Md. 1974)).
9' Id. at 755.
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college decisions .... ,, The Court drew an important distinction between
symbolic oversight and actual control in its analysis of the boards' func-
tions.95 Second, the Court pointed out that only the theology departments
made hiring decisions on a religious basis.96 Hiring criteria, according to
the Court, were primarily based on "academic quality."97 The Court agreed
with the lower court that any effort by an institution to "'stack its faculty
with members of a particular religious group' would have been noticed by
other faculty members, who had never been heard to complain."98 Further-
more, the Court closely scrutinized some of the day-to-day practices
occurring on some of the campuses, such as prayer in class, the hanging of
religious symbols in classrooms and even the "wearing of clerical garb" by
some of the instructors.99 It argued that none of these factors were
significant because there was "no 'actual college policy' of encouraging"
these practices.100 The totality of these factors helped influence the Court's
decision to uphold the Maryland statute in this case. In the majority's mind,
there was obvious evidence of sectarian activity on these campuses, but not
enough to tip the balance and overturn the statute on First Amendment
grounds.
In Hunt and Roemer, direct state aid to religious institutions of higher
learning was upheld because the Supreme Court saw no violation in
providing aid to institutions that were not pervasively sectarian. It was left
unclear what exactly constituted "pervasive" sectarianism. No one knew
how far the Court would go before it would invalidate a federal or state aid
program on Establishment Clause grounds under this standard. The
ambiguity surrounding this phrase and its applicability to institutions of
higher learning would remain unclear for years as more legal challenges
were brought to test the Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause
as it is applied to higher education finance programs.
IV. THE REAGAN-BUSH ERA AND THE FORMATION
OF AN IDEOLOGICALLY COMPLIANT SUPREME COURT MAJORITY
The election of Ronald Reagan as President of the United States in
1980 was an important turning point in the history of Establishment Clause
9 Id. (quoting Roemer, 387 F. Supp. at 1295).
95 See id.
96 Id. at 757.
97 Id.
9 Id. (quoting Roemer, 387 F. Supp. at 1294).
99 See id. at 756.
' Id. (quoting Roemer, 387 F. Supp. at 1293).
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jurisprudence. Politically, the American people were ready for a change in
leadership in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, the oil shocks, and the
Iran hostage crisis. On the education front, the path to integration in
America's public schools was being undercut by the rapid growth of
suburban neighborhoods and private schools around the country. Religious
conservatives, school choice advocates, and opponents of the wall of
separation between church and state were determined to elect a President
who would further their vision of American education. This vision, how-
ever, could only be realized by appointing Supreme Court justices who
would validate the constitutionality of various government aid programs
benefiting private and religious schools.
A. The Doctrine of "Neutrality" and Indirect Aid to Religious Schools
The Supreme Court's support for the idea of complete separation
between church and state waned considerably after Ronald Reagan was
elected to the White House. As state legislatures around the country passed
new forms of aid programs targeting nonpublic schools, the Court, instead
of adhering to a strict interpretation of the wall of separation, chose to
dissect each program in an effort to filter out permissible from impermissi-
ble forms of public aid. Along the way, new tests and terms of art were
created, further blurring the line separating church and state.
Some of the common types of government aid programs passed during
the 1980s took the form of tax credits or tax deductions.10' The leading case
on the subject of tax credits resulted from a Minnesota statute that allowed
parents to deduct from their income taxes a legislatively specified
amount." 2 In Mueller v. Allen, the Supreme Court approved the plan,
charting a new direction of greater flexibility in permitting public aid to
'o As the Nyquist decision revealed, the issue of public aid to private and
parochial schools in the form of tax credits or tax deductions was not a new idea.
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)
(holding that tax deductions for parents who sent their children to religious schools
violated the Establishment Clause). As in Nyquist, the Supreme Court in Grit v.
Wolman also affirmned a lower court's decision to invalidate an Ohio statute which
provided a tax credit to parents who sent their kids to nonpublic schools. Grit v.
Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973), aff'g Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.
Ohio 1972). Moreover, in Byrne v. Public Fundsfor Public Schools, 442 U.S. 907,
aff'g 590 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1979), the Supreme Court invalidated a tax benefit
program allowing nonpublic school parents in New Jersey a $100 tax deduction for
each dependent child in attendance at a tuition-charging nonpublic school.
102 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390 (1983).
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private and parochial schools. °3 Justice Rehnquist, applying the Lemon
test, concluded that the statute had a secular purpose, that it did not advance
religion, and that government entanglement with religion was minimal.0 4
Moreover, the Court distinguished between its rejection of earlier tax
deduction or credit schemes by noting that benefits under the former plans
were available only to parents of nonpublic school children, while the
Minnesota deduction was neutral in its application because it was available
to parents of "all" children in both public and nonpublic schools.'0 5 The
idea of permitting "neutral" aid in the form of tax deductions for religious
and secular educational expenses was a breakthrough for wall opponents
and school choice advocates. The Allen decision marked an important
juncture in the way the Supreme Court assessed the constitutionality of
government aid programs benefiting religious schools by placing the
emphasis on the manner in which the aid is distributed rather than who
specifically benefits from it.
In 1985, the Supreme Court reversed course temporarily, striking down
two programs offering public aid to parochial schools. In School District
of Grand Rapids v. Ball, the Court held that a Michigan plan offering
benefits to nonpublic schools through shared time and community educa-
tion programs financed by the public school system was in violation of the
Establishment Clause. 0 6 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, found
that the plan had the primary effect of advancing religion under the Lemon
test.'0 7 Moreover, in Aguilar v. Felton, the Court, again led by Justice
Brennan, struck down a New York City plan that provided Federal Title I
money to pay for the use of public school teachers in parochial schools to
teach remedial courses to their students.' 8 The Court found that the
103 id.
104Id. at 395-403.
'05 Id. at 397-98.
'0 Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), overruled in part
by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). Of the forty-one nonpublic schools
eligible for the program, forty were deemed "pervasively sectarian" in charac-
ter--that is the purpose of those schools was to advance their particular religions.
Id. at 379.
'07 A majority found a substantial risk that teachers--even those who were not
employed by the private schools---might "subtly (or overtly) conform their
instruction to the [pervasively sectarian] environment in which they [taught]." Id.
at 388.
'01 Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled in part by 521 U.S. 203
(1997). In 1965, Congress enacted Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10,79 Stat. 27 (1965) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.), "to ensure that all children have a fair, equal,
2003-2004]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
program violated the excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test
because public employees who teach on religious school premises must be
closely monitored to ensure that they do not "inculcate" religion." 9
Though the Ball case and the Aguilar decision were contrary to the
trend in favor of permitting more public aid to parochial schools, the
erosion of the wall continued during the 1980s as new appointments were
made to the Supreme Court. The appointments of Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy and Rehnquist as Chief Justice sent a sharp signal that
President Reagan was committed to a Supreme Court that was philosophi-
cally supportive of the idea of public aid to private and parochial schools.
This philosophy was enunciated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his dissent
in Wallace v. Jaffree in 1985, where he argued that the "wall of separation"
was a "metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved
useless as a guide to judging" and that it "should be frankly and explicitly
abandoned."" 0 The true intent of the Establishment Clause, he maintained,
was to prohibit a national religion or the "official designation of any church
as a 'national' one.""' It did not intend to create "government neutrality
between religion and irreligion, nor did it prohibit the federal government
from providing nondiscriminating aid to religion.""' 2 Rehnquist's dissent
lowered the bar for judicially-sanctioned aid to religious schools and it
and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education." 20 U.S.C. § 6301
(2003). Toward that end, Title I channels federal funds, through the States, to local
educational agencies which then disburse these funds to provide remedial
education, guidance and job counseling to eligible students. Id. § 6315(c). Title I
funds must be made available to all eligible children, regardless of whether they
attend public schools, id. § 6312(c), and the services must be "secular, neutral, and
nonideological." Id. § 6320. Moreover, Title I services provided to children
attending private schools must be "substantially comparable." Id. § 6321 (c)(1)(B).
109 Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 420. The Aguilar Court's finding of "excessive"
entanglement rested on three grounds: (i) the program would require "pervasive
monitoring by public authorities" to ensure that Title I employees did not inculcate
religion; (ii) the program required "administrative cooperation" between the
government and parochial schools; and (iii) the program might increase the dangers
of "political divisiveness." Id. at 413-14.
.. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This
case involved a state statute authorizing a moment of silence "for meditation or
voluntary prayer" in public school classrooms. Id. at 40. The Court held that the
statute was unconstitutional, rejecting the argument that the Establishment Clause
prohibits only government discriminationbetween religious sects. Id. at 53.
.' Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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helped set the stage for the eventual crumbling of the wall of separation
between church and state in American education.
B. Indirect Aid and "School Choice" in Higher Education
Prior to 1986, First Amendment challenges brought before the Supreme
Court in the higher education arena had dealt primarily with the issue of
direct federal and state aid to religious colleges and universities in the
United States. It had not yet addressed the question of indirect student aid
to private religious institutions or school choice. The issue of indirect aid
in the higher education realm was addressed by Witters v. Washington
Department of Services for the Blind in 1986.113 The question presented
in Witters was whether the First Amendment's Establishment Clause pre-
cluded the state of Washington from extending assistance under the state's
vocational rehabilitation assistance program to a blind person who chose
to study at a Christian college to become a pastor, missionary, or youth
director." 4 The Court held that the First Amendment did not preclude such
aid in this case, characterizing it as aid to individuals from which religious
schools could derive no significant benefit." 5
The Court opined that state aid could flow indirectly to religious
institutions "only as a result of the genuinely independent and private
choices of aid recipients" and as long as it was not likely that "any
significant portion of the aid expended under the.., program as a whole
[would] end up flowing to religious education."'1 16 The Court explained:
Washington's program is 'made available generally without regard to the
sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution
benefited,' and .... creates no financial incentive for students to under-
take sectarian education.... [T]he fact that aid goes to individuals means
that the decision to support religious education is made by the individual,
not by the State."
7
The majority also noted that only a small portion of the overall aid under
the state's program would go to religious education, even though several of
the justices thought that this point was irrelevant."'
"3 Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
" See id. at 483. Assistance under the Washington program is paid directly to
the student, who then transmits it to the educational institution of his or her choice.
Id. at 487.
"5 Id. at 488.
116id.
"' Id. at 488 (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 782-83 (1973)).
"' See id. at 487.
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The Supreme Court's decision in Witters established an important
precedent in the field of higher education. It allowed for public money to
be distributed indirectly to private religious colleges and universities by
way of individual choice. It also reinforced the Court's earlier application
of "neutral availability" discussed in Mueller recognizing that "the full
benefits of the program [are not] limited, in large part or in whole, to
students at sectarian institutions."'1 9 In effect, the Supreme Court appeared
to set forth a new standard for permissible aid to institutions of higher
learning; that as long as an institution was not pervasively sectarian and as
long as the aid did not constitute a significant portion of the overall aid
provided to the institution, public money could be distributed indirectly to
the institution through individual recipients.
By the early 1990s, the Supreme Court was comfortably in the control
of conservative wall opponents. Reagan's successor, George H.W. Bush,
solidified the conservative majority with the appointment of Clarence
Thomas. Accordingly, numerous challenges to the wall of separation were
brought by legislatures representing states with large percentages of
parochial school students. 2 ° The repeated efforts by legislatures to
circumvent the Establishment Clause gave the new majority an opportunity
to entertain further exceptions to the Establishment Clause in education
matters. The propensity of the Court to create new exceptions in Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence, though diametrically opposed to the intent
enunciated in Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance,' emboldened
opponents of the wall of separation to push forward in their efforts to tear
down the wall. Indeed, by the time Bill Clinton was elected to the White
House, then Justice Rehnquist's declaration that the wall "should be frankly
and explicitly abandoned' was fast becoming a reality.
V. THE CONSERVATIVE MAJORITY AND THE
CRUMBLING OF THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN
CHURCH AND STATE DURING THE 1990S
For nearly five decades, Establishment Clause jurisprudence in
American education rested on the theory that religion and government can
best work to achieve their aims if each is left free from the other. The
practical application of this theory, however, became less clear as the
9 Id. at 488-89.
'20 See infra Part V.
"2 See Madison, supra note 18.
'22 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court yielded repeatedly to pressure for specific exceptions to the
rule. Following the shift in ideological composition of the nation's highest
Bench, calls for increased government interaction with religion intensified
during the 1990s. The rise of the Christian Coalition and the evangelical
movement throughout the heartland presented new challenges for the
American system of education helping to fuel controversy over issues such
as school prayer, the posting of the Ten Commandments, and school
vouchers. Under the watchful eye of a more conservative Supreme Court,
the rise of sectarianism and the promise of school choice would soon clash
with the traditional idea of secular public school system as the new
majority moved to demolish the wall of separation once and for all in
American education.
A. The Convergence of "Neutrality" and "Choice " in Validating Public
Aid to Religion
Prior to the 1990s, the issues of neutrality, individual choice, and direct
and indirect aid to religious schools had been addressed by the Supreme
Court in separate cases, resulting in the establishment of specifically
tailored exceptions to the "no aid to religion" principle. These issues
converged in 1993 when the parents of a deaf boy named James Zobrest
asked the Supreme Court to allow the school district to furnish the boy
with a sign language interpreter, pursuant to the Individuals with Disabili-
ties Education Act ("IDEA")2 and its Arizona counterpart, 124 in a Roman
Catholic high school to facilitate his education. 25 In Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District, the Supreme Court held that the Establishment
Clause does not lay down a bar to the assignment of a public employee to
a sectarian school and, therefore, the school district should furnish an
interpreter to accompany Zobrest to classes at a Roman Catholic high
school if he so chooses.
126
In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist addressed the
neutrality question, the "choice" issue and the distinction between direct
and indirect aid in one decision. 127 "[G]overnment programs," he argued,
"that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without
reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment Clause
'2 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (2003).
124 ARiz. REv. STAT. §§ 15-761 to 15-774 (2003).
125 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
126 Id. at2.
127 Id.
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challenge just because sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated
financial benefit."' 28 He noted that the same reasoning in Mueller and
Witters applied in this case, whereby the service provided was a "general
government program that distributes benefits neutrally to any child"
without regard to the "sectarian-nonsectarian" nature of the school the child
attends.
29
Rehnquist also emphasized the importance of individual choice,
arguing that "[b]y according parents freedom to select a school of their
choice, the statute ensures that a government-paid interpreter will be
present in a sectarian school only as a result of the private decisions of
individual parents."' 30 He elaborated further on the choice issue by pointing
out that because the IDEA creates no financial incentive for parents to
choose a sectarian school, "an interpreter's presence ...cannot be
attributed to state decisionmaking."'' He then distinguished the govern-
ment aid programs in Meek and Ball from the IDEA program in this case
by describing the aid provided in those cases-instructional equipment and
material, teachers, and guidance counselors-as direct aid which "relieved
sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have borne in educating
their students." 132 He stated that "[d]isabled children, not sectarian schools,
are the primary beneficiaries of the IDEA;" schools "are only incidental
beneficiaries."'33 Moreover, he added that "the task of a sign-language
interpreter seems to us quite different from that of a teacher or guidance
counselor.... Nothing in this record suggests that a sign-language inter-
preter would do more than accurately interpret whatever material is
presented to the class as a whole."' 34
The Zobrest decision was an important precedent because it combined
several of the new standards for circumventing the wall of separation into
one disposition. The issues of neutrality, choice, and the direct/indirect
distinction were addressed by the Court and reinforced as solid exceptions
to the no aid to religion principle. The only issue not addressed by the
Court in Zobrest was the pervasively sectarian standard. Thus, as a result
of the Zobrest decision, religious organizations and wall opponents could
look to the convergence of neutrality and individual choice as a proper test
128 Id. at 8.
1291Id. at 10.
130 Id.
131 Id.
12Id. at 12.
133 Id.
'
34 Id. at 13.
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for measuring the validity of various schemes to distribute public aid to
parochial schools.'35
One such religious organization at the University of Virginia sought to
expand upon the new test by asking the Supreme Court to review the
constitutionality of a direct aid program to religious activities on campus.
In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, the
Supreme Court examined a constitutional challenge to a decision by the
University of Virginia denying funding to a student-run religious publica-
tion.'36 The funding was made available to numerous other student-run
publications through the university's Student Activity Fund.'3 7 The Court
held that there was no violation of the Establishment Clause in part because
"no public funds flow directly to [the publication's] coffers."' 38
The Court again focused on the principle of neutrality in making aid
available, arguing that "the guarantee of neutrality is respected, not
offended, when the government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded
policies, extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints,
including religious ones, are broad and diverse."'39 The Court for the first
time, however, expanded its usual analysis of neutrality by attempting to
narrow the kind of aid prohibited under the Establishment Clause to taxes
levied for the direct support of the church. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, argued:
"'35 A year later, in Board ofEducation v. Grumet, Justice Souter wrote that "the
principle is well grounded in our case law, as we have frequently relied explicitly
on the general availability of any benefit provided religious groups or individuals
in turning aside Establishment Clause challenges." Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512
U.S. 687, 704 (1994).
136 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822-23
(1995).
'
3 7 Id. "The [Student Activity Fund] receives its money from a mandatory fee"
and is designed "to support a broad range of extracurricular student activities that
'are related to the educational purpose of the University."' Id. at 824 (quoting
Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 61a, Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (No. 94-329)).
138 Id. at 842. The irony of the Supreme Court's decision in this case is
underscored by the fact that the University of Virginia, an instrumentality of the
Commonwealth for which it was named, was founded by Thomas Jefferson in
1819, and ranked by him, together with the authorship of the Declaration of
Independence and of the Virginia Act of Religious Freedom, as one of his three
most important achievements. These achievements are listed on Jefferson's
tombstone at Monticello just a few miles off campus.
39 Id. at 839.
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The neutrality of the program distinguishes the student fees from a tax
levied for the direct support of a church or group of churches. A tax of
that sort, of course, would run contrary to Establishment Clause concerns
dating from the earliest days of the Republic. The apprehensions of our
predecessors involved the levying of taxes upon the public for the sole
and exclusive purpose of establishing and supporting specific sects. The
exaction here, by contrast, is a student activity fee designed to reflect the
reality that student life in its many dimensions includes the necessity of
wide-ranging speech and inquiry and that student expression is an integral
part of the University's educational mission.
40
The idea of permitting nontax funds to be spent on religion as long as these
funds were neutrally available was a major step towards dismantling the
wall of separation between church and state. In effect, the Court ordered an
instrumentality of the State to support religion with direct funding.
The dissent in Rosenberger voiced its disapproval of Justice Kennedy's
reasoning. Justice Souter wrote, "[t]he opinion of the Court makes the
novel assumption that only direct aid financed with tax revenue is barred,
and draws the erroneous conclusion that the involuntary Student Activities
Fee is not a tax."''4 ' He also argued that "[u]sing public funds for the direct
subsidization of preaching the word is categorically forbidden under the
Establishment Clause, and if the Clause was meant to accomplish nothing
else, it was meant to bar this use of public money."' 42 "[A]ny such use of
[nontax funds]," he added, "would ignore one [of] the dual objectives of the
Establishment Clause, which was meant not only to protect individuals and
their republics from the destructive consequences of mixing government
and religion, but to protect religion from a corrupting dependence on
support from the Government."'
43
One of the more interesting aspects of the Rosenberger case was the
debate between Justice Thomas in his concurrence and Justice Souter in his
dissent over the original intent of the framers, particularly James Madison,
with respect to the Establishment Clause and public aid to religion. Thomas
argued that Madison's objection to the Virginia tax assessment bill of 1786
"did not rest on the premise that religious entities may never participate on
equal terms in neutral government programs."'" Instead, Justice Thomas
14o Id. at 840.
'41 Id. at 864-65 (Souter, J., dissenting).42 Id. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting).
'43 Id. at 891 (Souter, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 854 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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contended it was grounded in the notion that "the Virginia assessment was
flawed because it 'violate[d] that equality which ought to be the basis of
every law."" 45 Madison wrote against a background in which nearly every
colony had exacted a tax for church support. 46 According to Thomas,
Madison's views "'[indicate] that he saw the [First] Amendment as
designed to prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and perhaps
to prevent discrimination among sects,' but not 'as requiring neutrality on
the part of government between religion and irreligion.' ,,147 "In any event,"
he concluded, "the views of one man do not establish the original under-
standing of the First Amendment."'
148
The dissent attacked Thomas' concurrence as a misinterpretation
of Madison's intent. "Nowhere in the Remonstrance . . . did Madison
advance the view that Virginia should be able to provide financial support
for religion as part of a generally available subsidy program," argued
Justice Souter. 49 "In attempting to recast Madison's opposition as having
principally been targeted against 'governmental preferences for particular
religious faiths,"' Souter wrote, "Justice Thomas wishes to wage a battle
that was lost long ago . . . .""' Citing Everson and a number of other
Supreme Court precedents, Souter reasserted the Court's position with
respect to direct funding of religious activity:
The principle against direct funding with public money is patently
violated by the contested use of today's student activity fee. Like today's
taxes generally, the fee is Madison's threepence. The University exercises
the power of the State to compel a student to pay it and the use of any part
of it for the direct support of religious activity thus strikes at what we
have repeatedly held to be the heart of the prohibition on establishment.' 5'
According to Souter, Madison inveighed against government aid to religion
for a number of reasons, but critical here is the fact that those reasons
45 Id. (quoting Madison, supra note 18).
'4 See, e.g., PFEFFER, supra note 17, at 109, 123, 125-26; BuTrs & CREMIN,
supra note 18, at 15-22; BurTs, supra note 18, at 72.
147 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 856 (Thomas J., concurring) (quoting Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
'4 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
"4 Id. at 872 n. 1 (Souter, J., dissenting).
o Id. (citations omitted). Justice Souter points out that "[a]lthough it was a
taxation scheme that moved Madison to write in the first instance, the Court has
never held that government resources obtained without taxation could be used for
direct religious support." Id. at 890 (Souter, J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 873-74 (citations omitted).
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would have applied whether or not the aid was being distributed directly or
neutrally.
Until the Rosenberger decision, the prohibition against direct funding
of religious activities was a central tenet of Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence. The majority, however, dismissed that notion denying that the case
had anything to do with direct aid to a religious activity on a public
university campus. In Justice Kennedy's words, "We do not confront a case
where even under a neutral program that includes nonsectarian recipients,
the government is making direct money payments to an institution or group
that is engaged in religious activity."' 52 The dissent, however, disagreed,
noting that the Supreme Court never held that neutrality might be sufficient
to render direct aid to religion constitutional.'53
B. Agostini and Mitchell: Removing the Foundation of the Wall of
Separation
With the principles of neutrality and individual choice more firmly
established as standards for judging the validity of public aid programs
benefiting religious education, the Supreme Court next focused on har-
monizing its earlier jurisprudence with its more recent rulings. The
opportunity to overrule an earlier important decision came in 1997 when
the Supreme Court, inAgostini v. Felton, revisited the question put forth in
Aguilar of whether a New York program sending public school teachers
into parochial schools to provide remedial education to disadvantaged
children pursuant to Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965" was a violation of the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause. 155 The Agostini Court held that the program did not violate the
Establishment Clause. 5 6 According to the Court, relief was proper this time
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) and under the Supreme
Court's decision in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail157 "because the
'decisional law [had] changed to make legal what the [injunction] was
designed to prevent.' ,18 Specifically, petitioners pointed to the statements
'52 d. at 842.
153 Id. at 880.
14 For a brief discussion on this Act, see supra note 108.
15' Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
'56 Id. at 234-35.
'57 Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
158 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 214 (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388). Rule 60(b)(5)
states in part: "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a
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of five justices in Board of Education v. Grumet, calling for the overruling
of Aguilar.5 9
In the Agostini majority opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
reasoned that the Court's earlier decision in Aguilar and, in part, Ball had
been "undermined by subsequent Establishment Clause decisions,"
including Witters, Zobrest, and Rosenberger." She wrote, "In light of our
conclusion that Aguilar would be decided differently under our current
Establishment Clause law, we think adherence to that decision would
undoubtedly work a 'manifest injustice,' such that the law of the case
doctrine does not apply."'' O'Connor focused on the effect and entangle-
ment prongs of the Lemon test as well as the doctrines of neutrality and
individual choice. With regard to the former, she cited Zobrest arguing that
the Court had abandoned the presumption erected in Aguilar and Ball that
the "presence of a public employee on private school property creates an
impermissible 'symbolic link' between government and religion." 62
In referencing neutrality and individual choice, O'Connor reiterated the
standard adopted by the Court to determine the constitutionality of
programs providing public aid to parochial schools. She wrote, "where...
the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor
nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both religious and secular
party... from a final judgment [or] order... [when] it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application... ." FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b)(5).
In Rufo, the Supreme Court held that it is appropriate to grant a Rule 60(b)(5)
motion when the party seeking relief from an injunction or consent decree can
show "a significant change either in factual conditions or in law." Rufo, 502 U.S.
at 384.
'59 In Board of Education v. Grumet, the Supreme Court held that a New York
law that carved out a public school district to coincide with the boundaries of the
village of Kiryas Joel, an enclave of the Satmar Hasidic sect, violated the
Establishment Clause. In the course of the majority's opinion, the Court observed
that New York had created the special school district in response to the Aguilar
decision, which had required New York to cease providing IDEA services to
Satmar children on the premises of their religious private schools. Bd. of Educ. v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 692 (1994). Five Justices, including Rehnquist, Scalia,
Thomas, O'Connor, and Kennedy, joined opinions calling for reconsideration of
Aguilar. See id. at 717-18 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment); id. at 731 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 750 (Scalia, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
160Agostini, 521 U.S. at 216.
161 Id. at 236.
162Id. at 224.
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beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis"'63 it "is less likely to have the
effect of advancing religion."'" "[I]t is clear," she argued, "that Title I
services are allocated on the basis of criteria that neither favor nor disfavor
religion. The services are available to all children who meet the Act's
eligibility requirements, no matter what their religious beliefs or where they
go to school."'65 With regard to individual choice, O'Connor cited Zobrest,
asserting that "the provision of instructional services under Title I is
indistinguishable from the provision of sign-language interpreters under the
IDEA. Both programs make aid available only to eligible recipients. That
aid is provided to students at whatever school they choose to attend."'"
Agostini was a landmark ruling. Not only did the Court announce a rule
of unprecedented breadth, but it also modified the Lemon test-which asks
whether a statute (1) has a secular purpose, (2) has a primary effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion, or (3) creates an excessive entanglement
between government and religion' 67 -for the first time since its inception.
The Court in Agostini examined only the first and second factors, recasting
the entanglement inquiry as simply one element in determining a statute's
effect. "'68 The specific criteria used to determine an impermissible effect
includes: (1) whether the aid results in governmental indoctrination, (2)
whether the program defines its recipients by reference to religion, and (3)
whether the aid creates an excessive entanglement between government and
religion. 6 9 Moreover, the result in Agostini was to overrule Aguilar and
Ball and to expand, once again, the scope of permissible public aid
authorized to religious institutions under the Establishment Clause.
While the Agostini case was being decided, another important First
Amendment challenge was pending from Louisiana. In the case of Mitchell
v. Helms, the Supreme Court considered the question of whether Chapter
Two of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, as
applied in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, is a law respecting an establishment
of religion because many of the private schools receiving Chapter Two aid
163 Id. at 205.
164 id.
I65 d. at 232 (citations omitted).
'MId. at 228. O'Connor points out that "Title I funds [never] reach the coffers
of religious schools." The "funds are instead distributed to apublic agency... that
dispenses services directly to the eligible students within its boundaries, no matter
where they choose to attend school." Id. at 228-29.
1
67 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
168 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232-33.
169 id.
[VOL. 92
THE ROAD TO VOUCHERS
in that parish are religiously affiliated. 70 The Court, in a plurality decision,
held that Chapter Two was not such a law.'
In drafting the Court's opinion, Justice Thomas reconfirmed the
principles of neutrality and private choice and overruled the Court's earlier
decisions in Meek and Wolman. 72 First, Thomas addressed the principles
of neutrality and private choice, asserting that the heart of the Court's
reasoning inAgostini, Zobrest, Witters, and Mueller was upholding aid that
is offered to "a broad range of groups or persons without regard to their
religion" so long as the aid goes to a religious institution" 'only as a result
of the genuinely independent and private choices of individuals.' "'" The
Court determined that the Chapter Two program "does not result in
government indoctrination, because it determines eligibility for aid
neutrally, allocates that aid based on the private choices of the parents of
schoolchildren .... Nor does Chapter 2 define its recipients by reference
to religion."' 74
Though Thomas could have concluded his analysis at this point, he
instead chose to repudiate what he considered unworkable doctrines (the
direct/indirect distinction, divertibility, and the pervasively sectarian
standard) that preceded the doctrines of neutrality and private choice in
earlier cases. In addressing the direct/indirect distinction, Thomas argued
170 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). Chapter Two of the Education
Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 469, as
amended, 20 U.S.C. §§ 7301-73, is a close cousin of the provision of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 that the Supreme Court
considered in Agostini. Like the Title I program, Chapter Two channels federal
funds to local educational agencies, which are usually public schools districts, via
state educational agencies, to implement programs to assist children in elementary
and secondary schools. Among other things, Chapter Two provides:
"for the acquisition and use of instructional and educational materials,
including library services and materials (including media materials),
assessments, reference materials, computer software and hardware for
instructional use, and other curricular materials."
20 U.S.C. § 7215(a)(3). Chapter Two is now technically Subchapter VI of Chapter
70 of 20 U.S.C., where it was codified by the Improving America's School Act of
1994, Pub. L. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3707 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 20, 25, 29, & 42 U.S.C.).
171 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801. Justice Thomas announced the judgment of the
Court and delivered the opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Kennedy joined, and Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion.
172 Id. at 835.
173 Id. at 809-10 (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226).
174 Id. at 829.
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that the purpose of the distinction was merely to prevent "'subsidization'
of religion."'75 "Whether one chooses to label this program 'direct' or
'indirect' is a rather arbitrary choice, one that does not further the
constitutional analysis," he wrote.'76 He added that if aid to schools is
"neutrally available and, before reaching or benefiting any religious school,
first passes through the hands (literally or figuratively) of numerous private
citizens who are free to direct the aid elsewhere, the government has not
provided any 'support of religion."" 77 In Thomas' view, government aid
did not have to pass through individuals' hands in order for it to comply
with the Establishment Clause and, therefore, the issue of whether the aid
was "direct" or "indirect" was irrelevant.
Thomas next took up the issue of"divertibility" in examining whether
instructional and educational materials, including computers and overhead
projectors, can be used to inculcate a religious message in school.
According to Thomas, "any aid, with or without content, is 'divertible' in
the sense that it allows schools to 'divert' resources."' 78 He compared
Chapter Two aid in Jefferson Parish with the textbook question in Allen,
arguing that even though the "lack of divertibility motivated [the] holding
in Allen, it is hard to imagine any book that could not, in even moderately
skilled hands, serve to illustrate a religious message."' 79 "A concern for
divertibility ...is misplaced," he wrote, "because it is boundless-
enveloping all aid, no matter how trivial---and thus has only the most
attenuated (if any) link to any realistic concern for preventing an 'establish-
ment of religion.' "i80 It was Thomas' position that any aid which was
suitable for use in a public school was also suitable for use in any private
school.
Finally, Thomas addressed the pervasively sectarian standard, a factor
which had not been considered by the Court since Aguilar and Ball in 1985.
Citing Zobrest and Agostini (which overruled Aguilar and Ball in part),
'75 Id. at 816 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 394
(1985)).
1761d. at 818.
... Id. at 816 (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 489 (1986)). Thomas noted that Agostini relied primarily on Witters for this
conclusion and made clear that private choice and neutrality would resolve the
concerns formerly addressed by the rule in Ball. Id.
I" Id. at 824.
179 Id. at 823.
'Id. at 824. Thomas notes that the doctrine of divertibility was not considered
in Zobrest, Witters, or Mueller and therefore it should be rejected in this case. Id.
at 820-21.
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Thomas argued that the Court upheld aid programs to children who
attended primary and secondary schools that were pervasively sectarian.'
"[T]here was a period," he noted, "when this factor mattered, particularly
if the pervasively sectarian school was a primary or secondary school. But
that period is one that the Court should regret, and it is thankfully long
past."
,18
2
Thomas discussed several reasons for dispensing with the pervasively
sectarian standard in the constitutional analysis. First, he believed that it
was fast becoming irrelevant given the failure of the Court to consider the
issue in more recent precedents.' Second, it was Thomas' view that the
"religious nature of a recipient should not matter to the constitutional
analysis, so long as the recipient adequately furthers the government's
secular purpose."'8' "If a program offers permissible aid to the religious
(including the pervasively sectarian), the areligious, and the irreligious," he
claimed, "it is a mystery which view of religion the government has
established, and thus a mystery what the constitutional violation would
be."' 8' Third, he argued that an "inquiry into the recipient's religious
views" was "offensive" and that such an inquiry "collides with [Supreme
Court] decisions that have prohibited governments from discriminating in
the distribution of public benefits based upon religious status or
sincerity.""' Finally, in what maybe an attempt to defend his own Catholic
identity, Thomas asserted that "hostility" to pervasively sectarian schools,
particularly Catholic schools, "has a shameful pedigree that we do not
hesitate to disavow."'8 7 "This doctrine, born of bigotry should be buried
now," he concluded.'
..1 Id. at 827.2Id. at 826 (citations omitted).
I3 d. at 826-27.
'4 Id. at 827.
185 Id.
'16 Id. at 828.
187 Id. Thomas points out that opposition to aid to sectarian schools emerged in
"the 1870s with Congress's consideration (and near passage) of the Blaine Amend-
ment, which would have amended the Constitution to bar any aid to sectarian
institutions." At that time, he notes, there was "pervasive hostility to the Catholic
Church and to Catholics in general," and the term "sectarian" was widely viewed as
a code word for "Catholic." Id. Today, however, state constitutions in forty-seven
states still restrict state legislatures from approving voucher money for "sectarian"
private schools under similar to provisions to the Blaine Amendment. After the Blaine
Amendment failed in Congress in 1875, many states simply amended their own
constitutions to adopt the language. See HOWARD, supra note 80.
118 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 829.
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The Supreme Court's rulings inAgostini andMitchellwere tremendous
blows to the wall of separation. By renouncing the basic doctrines or tests
upon which the constitutionality of government aid programs were
measured, the Court removed the foundation of the wall that had been
erected over the last several decades. Ostensibly, the only form of
prohibited aid to religious education left as a result of the crumbling of the
wall was the direct monetary subsidization of religious education itself by
government. But even this form of aid was at best questionable in the wake
of the Court's decision inRosenberger, which disavowed the direct/indirect
aid distinction altogether in allowing public money to flow to religious
activities on campus. 89 Justice Souter, in his dissenting opinion in Agostini,
best summed up the state of the law when he wrote that "[t]here is simply
no line that can be drawn between the instruction paid for at taxpayers'
expense and the instruction in any subject that is not identified as formally
religious."'90
With the wall of separation between church and state in American
education substantially eroded, the five Justices--Rehnquist, O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-who had helped to tear down the wall were
in position to take the next step and authorize vouchers through the
doctrinal vehicles of neutrality and school choice. The remainder of this
article analyzes the Supreme Court's most recent decision in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, the Cleveland voucher case, and the broader question of
whether there still exists a wall separating church and state in American
education.
VI. ZELMAN V. SIMMONS-HARRIS: THE TRIUMPH
OF PRIVATE "SCHOOL CHOICE" IN AMERICAN EDUCATION
The road to vouchers in American education was paved during the
Reagan-Bush era with the appointment of five conservative Supreme Court
Justices who were influenced by conservative leaders, the religious right
and the alleged crisis in America's inner-city public schools. In 1998, the
city of Milwaukee made national headlines when the Wisconsin Supreme
Court declared the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program-authorizing
school vouchers to inner city parents--constitutional in Jackson v.
Benson.'9 ' The Milwaukee voucher decision eventually was appealed to the
'89 See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
190 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 245 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting).
'91 Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997
(1998).
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U.S. Supreme Court, but the Court denied certiorari, thus indicating its
stance on the voucher issue. The Milwaukee example prompted other cities
around the nation to establish similar programs which were the subjects of
numerous court challenges. A specific pilot project in Ohio, however,
would ultimately reach the Supreme Court and force the Court to enunciate
its true position on the voucher issue.
A. The Cleveland Voucher Decision: The End of the Road for Wall
Supporters
In 1995, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
placed the entire school district of Cleveland, Ohio under state control,
declaring "a crisis of magnitude" among some of the worst public schools
in the nation. 92 Student performance in the district was dismal, the drop-
out rate far exceeded the graduation rate, and the district itself failed to
meet many of the basic standards required by the state to operate.' 93
According to the Ohio State Auditor, the Cleveland public school system
was in the midst of a "crisis... unprecedented in the history of American
education.' 194
Against this background, the State of Ohio established a pilot program
designed to provide educational choices to families with school children
who reside in the Cleveland City School District.'95 The program provided
financial assistance to families in any Ohio school district that was or had
been "under federal court order requiring supervision and operational
management of the district by the state superintendent." 96 Under the tuition
aid portion of the program, any private school, religious or nonreligious,
could participate and accept program students as long as the school was
192 Reed v. Rhodes, 1 F. Supp. 2d 705, 705 (N.D. Ohio 1995), aff'd, 215 F.3d
1327 (6th Cir. 2000).
193 See Cleveland City School District Performance Audit 2-1 (Mar. 1996). A
copy of the Audit is available from the Auditor of the State of Ohio by calling
1-800-282-0370.
194 id.
'"See Pilot Project Scholarship Program, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974-
3313.979 (Anderson 2003).
1
9 6 1d. § 3313.975(A). The program provides two kinds of aid to parents of
children in covered district. First, the program provides tuition aid for students in
kindergarten through third grade, to attend a participating public or private school
oftheirparent's choosing. Id. § 3313.975(B), (C)(I). Second, the program provides
tutorial aid for students who choose to remain enrolled in public school. Id. §
3313.975(A).
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located within the boundaries of the Cleveland school district and met
statewide educational standards.' 97 Any public school located in a school
district adjacent to the covered district could also have participated in the
program.'98 All participating schools, whether public or private, were
required to accept students in accordance with rules and procedures
established by the state superintendent.' 99 Tuition aid was distributed to
parents according to financial need.200
In July 1999, a group of Ohio taxpayers challenged the Ohio program
in United States District Court, seeking to enjoin it on the basis that it
violated the Establishment Clause. The District Court granted summary
judgment for the challengers20 ' and that decision was affirmed the next year
by a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, which found that the program had the primary effect of advancing
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.20 2 On appeal to the
Supreme Court, the Court, unlike in the Milwaukee voucher case, granted
certiorari.203
The question presented before the Supreme Court was whether the
Ohio program had the forbidden effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion.20 4 The Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that it did not.205 Citing
Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that these
cases
make clear that where a government aid program is neutral with respect
to religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens
197 Id. § 3313.976(A). Participating private schools may not discriminate on the
basis of race, religion, or ethnic background, or to "advocate or foster unlawful
behavior or teach hatred of any person or group on the basis of race, ethnicity,
national origin, or religion." Id. § 3313.976(A)(6).
'I Id. § 3313.976(C).
'99 d. § 3313.976(A)(l)-(8).
200 If parents choose a private school, checks are made payable to the parents
who then endorse the checks over to a chosen school. Id. § 3313.979.
201 Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
202 Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000).
203 Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 533 U.S. 976 (2001).
204 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002). As in most of the
recent decisions involving the constitutionality of government aid programs to
religious schools, the Supreme Court found in applying the first prong of the
Lemon test that the program was enacted for a valid secular purpose, in this case
"providing educational assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing public
school system." Id.
205 Id. at 643-44. Chief Justice Rehnquist filed the opinion in which Justices
O'Connor, Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy concurred.
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who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result
of their own genuine and independent private choice, the program is not
readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.20 6
As was true in those cases, the Ohio program was determined to be
"neutral in all respects toward religion" and one of "true private choice."2 °7
"[N]o reasonable observer," argued Rehnquist, "would think a neutral
program of private choice... carries with it the imprimatur of government
endorsement. 2 08
Unable to rely on the traditional arguments of divertibility or pervasive
sectarianism, the dissent, led by Justice Stevens, raised two new arguments
in opposition to the Court's ruling. The first argument focused on the Ohio
program itself and the fact that the vast majority of the voucher recipients
received religious indoctrination at state expense.20 9 Stevens wrote:
The State may choose to divide up its public schools into a dozen
different options and label them magnet schools, community schools, or
whatever else it decides to call them, but the State is still required to
provide a public education and it is the State's decision to fund private
school education over and above its traditional obligation that is at issue
in these cases.
210
According to Stevens, the fact that public money was used to fund the
religious education of Ohio citizens supported the conclusion that "the law
is one 'respecting an establishment of religion."' 2 ' In addition, Stevens
revived the old concern over "political divisiveness" that was at the heart
of Jefferson's and Madison's thinking in drafting the Establishment Clause
and related it to the present era of global conflict. He argued:
I have been influenced by my understanding of the impact of religious
strife on the decisions of our forbears to migrate to this continent, and on
the decisions of neighbors in the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and the
Middle East to mistrust one another. Whenever we remove a brick from
the wall that was designed to separate religion and government, we
206 Id. at 652.
207 Id. at 653.
20 1 Id. at 655.
209 Id. at 684.
21 1 Id. at 685.
211 id.
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increase the risk of religious strife and weaken the foundation of our
democracy.
212
Justice Stevens criticized the majority for approving the voucher
scheme while maintaining that the figurative wall of separation enunciated
in Everson is still intact. "It is only by ignoring Everson," Stevens added,
"that the majority can claim to rest on traditional law in its invocation of
neutral aid provisions and private choice to sanction the Ohio law. 21 3
The Court's ruling in Zelman was a landmark decision paving the way
for federal and statewide voucher programs across the country. Since the
decision, several states have proposed similar voucher legislation. 24 Not
since Everson has a single case had such a profound impact on public
education. With the wall of separation between church and state practically
demolished, the question remains whether the Establishment Clause is even
relevant in determining the constitutionality of government aid to religious
schools.
B. The Aftermath of the Cleveland Voucher Ruling and the Drive for
"Religion-Based" Programs
Since the Cleveland voucher decision in 2002, efforts to promote public
aid to parochial schools and other religious-based initiatives have acceler-
ated.21'5 Anticipating Zelman, Governor Jeb Bush of Florida signed into law
the first comprehensive state voucher program in the country.2 16 Under
Florida's A-plus Program, a public school student's parent or guardian may
request and receive from the state an opportunity scholarship for the child
to enroll in and attend a private or parochial school when that child's public
school is determined to be failing by the state.217 This program was
212 Id. at 686.
213 1d. at 688.
214 See Krista Kafer, Progress on School Choice in the States, 3-6, The Heritage
Foundation (July 10, 2003), at http://www.heritage.orgIResearch/Education/
g1639.cfm.
215 "Each year, about $65 million is spent by foundations and individuals to
promote vouchers." National Education Association, Vouchers, NEA on the Issues
(Oct. 2001), at http://www.nea.org/vouchers.
216 Since the Florida voucher program was passed, at least eleven states have
entertained bills pertaining to vouchers and/or school choice in the last two years.
See Kafer, supra note 214.
217 FLA. STAT. ch. 1008.33 (2003). Each public school is assigned a grade of
"A" through "F" based on the proportion of its students earning a passing grade on
the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test. Id. § 1008.34.
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established notwithstanding Article I, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution
which states that:
No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall
ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any
church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institu-
tion.218
Today, opportunities for school choice in Florida exceed the federal
requirements set out in President Bush's "No Child Left Behind" Act as
Florida parents have both public and private school choice options
whenever a school fails to meet state requirements in two of four years.219
"By offering vouchers to students" as a legal sanction against under-
performing public schools, "the Florida plan is intended to motivate those
schools to improve their academic performance. 22 °
At the national level, the call for more public aid to religious institu-
tions as a whole has intensified in the wake of Zelman. In April 2003,
Education Secretary Rod Paige raised a storm of protest when he remarked:
All things equal, I would prefer to have a child in a school that has a
strong appreciation for the values of the Christian community, where the
child is taught to have a strong faith .... That's not the case in a public
school where there are so many different kids with different kinds of
values. 22
Secretary Paige's department oversees federal programs serving the
nation's 86,000 public schools. "His department recently advised the
nation's public school districts that public schools that blocked the
religious expression of students on school grounds risked losing federal
money.1
222
President Bush also has taken steps to further undercut the wall of
separation between church and state by establishing his "Faith-Based
2I FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 3.
219 Federal law requires only public school choice and only when a school has
failed to meet adequate yearly progress for two consecutive years. 20 U.S.C. §
6136(b)(1)(A), (E) (2003).
22 LISA SNELL, SCHOOL VOUCHERS AS A LEGAL SANCTION 3 (Reason Public
Policy Institute, Policy Study No. 284, July 2001), available at www.rppi.org/
ps284.pdf (on file with author).
221 See Schemo, supra note 5.
222 id.
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Initiative" program. In December 2002, he "issued executive orders telling
federal agencies not to discriminate against religious groups in awarding
social services contracts. 223 In January 2003, the President authorized the
Department of Housing and Urban Development to oversee the use of tax
dollars to build religious centers where worship occurs, "as long as part of
the building is used for social services., 224 A few months later, he
authorized the use of "federal grants to renovate churches and religious
sites that are designated historic landmarks. 225 Most recently, he has been
seeking from Congress legislation that would make it easier for "religious
groups to compete for government grants" and "favor members of their own
faith in hiring," thereby ignoring anti-discrimination laws.226 "I continue to
urge Congress to take additional steps to end discrimination against faith-
based organizations," he stated during an interview. 227 The United States
Senate responded in April to the President's request by passing a "pared"
down version of his "faith-based initiative" program entitled the Charity,
Aid, Recovery and Empowerment Act.228 Thus, in the rush to capitalize on
the Zelman decision, the President, Congress, and wall opponents have
been trampling upon the last vestiges of the Establishment Clause.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the Second World War, the arena of public and private education
has become the primary battleground upon which the struggle to tear down
the "wall of separation" between church and state has been waged. Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison sought to protect the new Republic from
223 See Laurie Goodstein & Richard Stevenson, In Shift, US. to Offer Grants
to Historic Churches, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2003, at A15.
224 See Adam Cohen, What Mr. Jefferson Would Think ofMs. Myles 's Addiction
Program, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, at 12.
225 Goodstein & Stevenson, supra note 223.
226 See Sheryl G. Stolberg, Senators Set Deal on Religion-Basedlnitiative, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2003, at A8.
" See Sheryl G. Stolberg, Senate Passes Version of Religion Initiative, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 2003, at A24.
228 Charity, Aid, Recovery and Empowerment (CARE) Act of 2003, S. 476,
108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003). The Charity, Aid, Recovery and Empowerment Act
offers tax advantages intended to encourage charitable giving and benefit soup
kitchens, maternity homes and other community groups. It would increase social
services grants to states by $1.3 billion and "would provide technical assistance to
small groups, including black and Hispanic churches, that need help competing for
federal financing." Stolberg, supra note 227.
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religious strife by erecting a wall of separation between church and state at
the outset of the American experiment. They believed that religious liberty
could be achieved best under a government which was prohibited from
taxing or supporting religious activity of any kind, or from interfering with
the religious beliefs of any individual or group. Jefferson's Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom229 and Madison's Memorial and Remon-
strance.. provided the intellectual and philosophical foundations for the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, which today continue to
enshrine the basic prohibition against government aid to religion.
Over the last four decades, however, the wall of separation between
church and state as it applies to education gradually has been torn down due
to increased pressure from religious groups for more school choice and the
changing ideological composition of the Supreme Court. From the Court's
decision in Everson recognizing a strict adherence to the wall of separation
to its most recent ruling in Zelman authorizing school vouchers, numerous
exceptions to the "no aid to religion" principle were carved out to permit
government aid to flow to religious schools. The Lemon test, the doctrine
of divertibility, and the "pervasively sectarian" standard were examples of
these exceptions or tests established by the Court to assess the validity of
government aid programs. The application of these tests often yielded
outcomes that reflected the ideological preferences of individual Justices
for a particular aid program.
The wall of separation between church and state began to crumble in
the 1990s, following the appointment of Justice Clarence Thomas to the
Supreme Court. With five conservative Justices on the Bench (Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas), the
Supreme Court handed down several important decisions, including
Mueller, Zobrest, Agostini, and Mitchell, which overruled earlier prece-
dents and undercut the stricter "no aid to religion" standard used to assess
the constitutionality of government aid programs benefiting religious
schools. In renouncing the "no aid to religious" principle, the Court
removed the foundation upon which the wall had been erected. The
crumbling of the wall opened the door to vouchers in Zelman which in turn
set the stage for increased government involvement in religious education
for years to come.
In the wake of the Zelman decision, conservative leaders in Washington
and various states have been pressing forward with plans to establish
voucher schemes and other government aid programs benefiting religious
29 VIRGINIA STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 12.
230 Madison, supra note 18.
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schools.2 3' The Bush Administration's support for these plans coupled with
the movement for greater accountability in public schools are indicative of
the continuing push to ensure that public aid is redirected away from public
education toward private and religious education.232 Moreover, the
President's successful push on Capitol Hill to direct more public aid to
religious groups through his "Faith-Based Initiative" campaign reveals that
all three branches of the Government are committed to the use of taxpayer
money to further sectarian ends.233 With the "wall of separation" between
church and state practically demolished and a compliant Supreme Court
majority supporting the President's agenda, opponents of the wall of
separation appear to be winning their struggle to strengthen the govern-
ment's role in religious affairs.
13' See supra notes 2-5, 215-28, and accompanying text.
232 See supra notes 2-3, 223, and accompanying text.
See supra notes 3-5, 223-28, and accompanying text.
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